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Abstract
In an increasingly interdependent world, not only politics but also societies
become ever more intertwined. Therefore, foreign policy-making is
progressively influenced by domestic factors, not only in the country in
question but also in others. This special issue seeks to shed light on the
degree to which Latin American civil societies and social movements are
shaping foreign policy. The provisional, though contested, answer is ‘not
much.’
Keywords: Foreign Policy; Civil Society; Social Movements; Public
Opinion; Latin America.
Introduction
Domestic politics and international relations
are often somehow entangled, but our theories
have not yet sorted out the puzzling tangle. It is
fruitless to debate whether domestic politics
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really determine international relations, or the
reverse. The answer to that question is clearly,
“Both, sometimes”. The more interesting
questions are, “When?” and “How?” – Robert
Putnam (1988)
SO begins Robert Putnam’s famous article of 1988 in which he set
out the research agenda for the study of diplomacy (and foreign
policy) as a two-level game that links the inside of a state with its
outside. The editors of this special issue decided, let credit be given
where credit is due, that the time was ripe to address Putnam’s
questions in respect of Latin America. When and how have social
demands influenced the international relations of the region’s
states? By the same token, when and how have international politics
affected Latin American civil societies? This special issue provides
a welcome boost to an emerging discussion.
There is a widespread perception that foreign policy is elitist, which
stems from the belief that issues pertaining to faraway countries are
too remote to matter in the daily lives of ordinary people. It is also
true that foreign policy is somehow different from other public
policies. Domestic legislation on foreign policy is less necessary,
and therefore less frequent, than in more conventional policy areas
like finance, criminal law, health, or education. Major changes can
be effected via speeches delivered by heads of state, or decisions
made by them unilaterally. It also means that the translation of
presidential preferences into actual policy will depend far more on
control over the bureaucratic apparatus than on legislative majorities
or popular support. Because of the ensuing reduced accountability,
foreign policy is an area prone to words diverging from deeds.
Rhetoric, as Latin America insists on proving over and over again,
frequently runs parallel to achievements – or even in the opposite
direction (Jenne and Schenoni 2015; Malamud 2005; Montesinos
1996). This makes foreign policy difficult to analyse, as relying on
official sources is essential as well as misleading.
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Foreign policy actors often exaggerate the power of agency, and their
own role in events. This is not necessarily a lie but a cognitive bias:
most people are inclined to believe, and want to believe, that their
actions matter. Yet, in international affairs, structure is so heavy that
it tends to prevail over agency more often than not – especially in
normal times, as opposed to Machiavelli’s exceptional times. The
normal predominance of structure over agency is widely accepted
irrespective of paradigmatic approach, and does not deny the
co-constitutive nature of both. As for the Latin American experience,
Octavio Amorim Neto and I have shown that, over the past 70 years,
the foreign policies of Brazil and Mexico were determined more by
their relative power vis-à-vis the USA than by the domestic
distribution of power or preferences. However, this was not the case
for Argentina, in which domestic turbulence had more influence over
foreign policy-making than international factors (Amorim Neto and
Malamud 2015). This finding does not contradict structural realism,
which does not predict that all states will conform to realpolitik
principles, but rather that those states which do not will be worse off
than those which do (Feaver et al. 2000: 165). Argentina is a good
illustration of this tenet.
Foreign policy may express political struggles and organisational
traditions (Allison 1971), or even leaders’ personal moods rather
than rational planning. The international politics of Latin America,
far removed from the hot spots of global politics, constitutes a
laboratory for analysing the degree to which foreign policy can be
subordinated to domestic struggles, since the damage produced by
incoherent outcomes are mostly harmless to foreign parties but will
take a toll on the domestic losers. Four factors are capable of
insulating foreign policy from civil society: the institutional
attributions endowed on the executive by the constitution, the degree
of professionalisation of the diplomatic corps, the degree of
presidentialisation of decision-making (Amorim Neto and Malamud
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2016), and the visibility of foreign policy issues in the domestic
agenda. The more the attributions, the more the professionalisation,
the more the presidentialisation, and the lower the domestic
visibility, the less the margin for civil society to influence the policy
process.
On the other hand, foreign affairs is the policy area that can most
easily be changed with symbolic gestures and official
pronouncements. Hence, a Latin America country with highly
ideologised political forces is more likely to see the conduct of its
foreign policy affected by domestic factors, namely elections.
Although conflating the electorate with civil society is a conceptual
stretch, the vote manifests social demands at least as legitimately as
sectoral lobbying or mass mobilisation. Public opinion, interest
groups, and social movements – the key components of civil society
– are at the core of this special issue, and their influence over foreign
policy is reflected upon below.
Types and limits of social
demands
Since ever, the Brazilian diplomatic corps has been regarded as the
most prestigious and successful in Latin America. However, a few
years ago, Cason and Power (2009) showed that two trends had
manifested themselves in Brazilian foreign policy-making since the
mid-1990s: the pluralisation of actors, and the rise of presidential
diplomacy. These trends gradually eroded the influence of the highly
professionalised and traditionally autonomous foreign ministry,
known as Itamaraty. Cason and Power argued that there were global,
regional, and domestic political factors behind this transformation,
but those that matter to us in this issue are domestic. According to
their reasoning, ‘it was precisely because a leftist president was
elected that bureaucratic power was pluralized’ (Cason and Power
2009: 128-129). Only Lula was capable of articulating the
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progressive South-South agenda advanced by the foreign policy
troika of minister Celso Amorim, deputy minister Samuel Pinheiro
Guimarães, and presidential advisor Marco Aurélio Garcia, with the
outward-oriented business interests represented by the heavyweight
ministers Henrique Meirelles, Luiz Fernando Furlan and Roberto
Rodrigues. Presidentialisation, the argument goes, promoted
pluralisation.
The rollback of Itamaraty has allowed both government and
non-government agencies to step into foreign policy matters. The
former include other ministries and the national congress; the latter,
business associations, media outlets and, to a lesser degree, NGOs,
research centres, and labour unions. This special issue investigates
whether this growing influence is also on display in other Latin




Ribeiro and Pinheiro wonder what factors determine presidential
success in congress in respect of foreign policy. They address this
question by analysing legislative support for the foreign policies and
initiatives of 22 Latin-American presidents in eight countries from
1994 to 2014. As noted previously, there are fewer laws about
foreign policy than other policy areas, and many of them are
international treaties requiring legislative ratification. This means
that legislatures cannot alter the written texts, but are limited to
voting for or against. In bicameral legislatures, this also means that
only the upper chamber is required to vote. These caveats
notwithstanding, the finding Ribeiro and Pinheiro arrive at is
astonishingly counterintuitive: ‘the president’s popularity and the
contents of the initiative – [whether] high [or] low politics – do not
affect his or her legislative support in international affairs’. We
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should infer that, if social demands on foreign policy are represented
at all at the institutional level, this should rather be via legislatures
rather than presidents, as the former will decide regardless of the
president’s popular support.
Two articles in this issue focus exclusively on public opinion. Onuki,
Mouron and Urdinez explore a large database to establish that Latin
American states can be clustered into three categories as regards
citizens’ perceptions: Brazil, the middle powers, and the rest.
Brazilians do not regard themselves as Latin Americans, but rather as
citizens of a distinct country surrounded by Latin America. At the
same time, they would like their country to lead the region, but are
disinclined to bear the costs. Citizens of all the other countries
included in the study identify themselves as Latin American, but
those of middle powers, like Argentina and Mexico, contest
Brazilian leadership of the region. Citizens of smaller countries, on
the other hand, more easily accept Brazil as a regional leader.
According to the authors, these beliefs are significant for foreign
policy because they impose limits on the conditions for regional
integration, namely a shared identity, and the presence of an
uncontested paymaster. In this issue area, public preferences
restrain, rather than enable, the margin of maneuvre of
decision-makers.
Lustig and Olego conduct experimental research to single out the
determinants of the attitudes of Argentine citizens towards Brazil.
Their findings suggest that public perceptions are mostly positive,
and as new information reinforces previous preconceptions,
negative or dissonant elements are discarded. They wonder how
efficient soft politics can be (I guess they rather mean public
diplomacy) in courting another country’s public opinion, provided
that new information will only reinforce pre-existing attitudes
irrespective of their sign. Compared with those of Onuki, Mouron
and Urdinez, their findings are simultaneously more favourable to
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Brazil – as it depicts benevolent rather than suspicious Argentinians
– and more inconvenient, as it suggests that ‘soft’ politics, or public
diplomacy, would be ineffective as foreign policy instruments.
Mesquita and Medeiros analyse media discourse rather than public
opinion. They show a gap between Brazil’s official discourse and the
media, and within the media itself. Their empirical investigation
leads them to claim that, while Brazil reformed its international
identity after Lula’s inauguration, national and foreign media
continued to judge this in terms of their previous editorial ideology.
Rather than questioning the inability of Brazilian foreign policy to
change biases in the media, they focus on ‘the refusal [of some
newspapers] to validate Brazil’s new identity’. In their narrative, the
reason is not that these media outlets are more powerful than the
emerging Latin American power, but that they incarnate class or
national interests which clash with Brazil’s.
Trade policy and social
mobilisation
Four articles deal with international trade issues, which have taken
centre stage since transnational political mobilisations in Latin
America were faced with the formation of the Free Trade Area of the
Americas (FTAA). Vinícius Rodrigues compares how civil society
organisations and organised social movements have interacted with
policy-makers in Brazil and Mexico, as both kinds of social actors
have been active in both countries. Rodrigues seeks to show that
participation in the policy-making process, which has been allowed,
does not equal influence over outcomes, which has been denied. Yet
this is a risky conclusion, as the same could be said of any losers in an
electoral or similar procedure. The assertion that the contributions
made by social actors ‘did not change the positions the government
had initially set’ cannot be extended to imply that the outcome lacked
democratic legitimacy: losing is also part of the democratic process.
A Few Non-Conclusive Thoughts about
Foreign Policy and Social Demands
509
Contexto Internacional (PUC)
Vol. 38 no 1 – jan/abr 2016
1ª Revisão: 20/03/2016
However, the conclusion is useful and provocative, as the author
wonders ‘whether left-wing governments [have] really
empower[ed] social demands’.
Daniel Castelan raises a challenging puzzle: he posits that Brazilian
industrialists and trade unions had the same interests in the FTAA
negotiations, but did not join forces, or adopt a unified strategy. The
assumption is already puzzling at the outset, as it is usually
considered that business associations support the liberalisation of
trade. Instead, Castelan claims, industrialists were as protectionist as
workers. The differences that prevented them from forming a
coalition were situated elsewhere, mainly around the role of the state
in an open economy, labour and social rights, social security, and the
structure of taxation. This conclusion may shed light on the previous
article’s argument: business and labour participated on an equal
footing, but as they could not agree on a common position, one of
them won, and the other lost. Anyway, the FTAA never saw the light
of day.
María Esther Coronado Martínez analyses Mexico’s
implementation of the North America Plan for Avian and Pandemic
Influence (NAPAPI) during the 2009 H1N1 outbreak. She shows
that some Mexican institutions established consultation processes
with the private sector and NGOs, although they were not binding.
Moreover, the foundation of a trilateral epistemic community for
dealing with influenza pandemics was a significant achievement.
Yet the article ends by noting that the real actors were ‘federal and
local agencies in different sectors’, whose goal was ‘to protect the
people and to avoid a major catastrophe’. Therefore, state institutions
rather than civil society appear to have defined the policy process for
revising the trinational plan.
Gilberto Aranda refers to the mobilisation of an association of rural
municipalities, the Aymaras Without Frontiers Strategic Alliance, to
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form a transnational ethnic community together with similar
organisations in Bolivia and Peru. This can be regarded as a
simultaneous case of para-diplomacy (between subnational units)
and transnational diplomacy (between social actors). However, the
conclusion about the consequences of this initiative for Chilean
foreign policy and its relations with human rights, which is supposed
to be at the core of the article, is far from clear.
Emergent powers and high
politics
Does civil society play any role in the emergence of a peripheral
country on the global stage? Megan Pickup argues that it does,
though a minor one. She analyses whether Brazil’s Southern
partnerships can be explained by the rise of the left – that is, by the
coming to power of the Workers’ Party. Unlike Mesquita and
Medeiros, she does not conflate South-South relations with
universalism, which are contradictory orientations. Rather, she
shows that social actors and the political leanings of governments
had some influence over foreign partnerships in the Global South,
but were too weak to result in a coherent project. Unsurprisingly, she
concludes that agribusiness interests have carried the day, and that
Brazil’s ‘benevolent’ foreign policy has failed to correct global
power asymmetries.
Daniel Cardoso uses the concept of network governance to examine
the mechanisms through which domestic politics influenced Brazil’s
foreign policy towards China. He demonstrates that interactions
among social actors were largely informal and, albeit recurrent, did
not take place on a regular basis. He shows that NGOs, trade unions
and universities were rarely involved in making and implementing
Brazilian policy towards China. The most relevant actors were a
wide array of state agencies, private companies and business
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associations. Therefore, policy networks connected political and
economic interests rather than civil society demands.
Anabella Busso’s ode to Kirchnerism explains how, in the aftermath
of the state collapse of 2001, the new Argentine administration had to
address severe domestic constraints on foreign policy-making.
Referring to the common good, Busso notes that the Kirchner
administrations faced strong opposition from corporations and the
media, as well as from some single-cause social movements. She
depicts civil society as a protégé rather than a driver of foreign policy.
Democratisation, in this view, did not mean social participation, but
state protection.
The analysis of Venezuelan foreign policy by Mijares and Romero
focuses exclusively on politics rather than society, and foreign policy
in particular. In their view, it is the confrontation between Chavism
and the opposition that defines the scenarios and outcomes of
Venezuela’s external behaviour; radicalisation and polarisation
leave no room for civil society and social organisations to influence
the policy-making process.
Foreign policy is public
policy, but not like the
others
Apart from its aloofness from the citizenry, and the concentration of
competencies in the executive, foreign policy differs from other
public policies in that it is far more heavily influenced by
international dynamics that are beyond government control.
Neoclassical realism focuses on the transmission belt between the
systemic distribution of power on the one hand, and foreign policy
choices on the other. This means that the perceptions of political
leaders and elites matter, but also that they ‘do not always have
complete freedom to extract and direct national resources as they
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might wish. Power analysis must therefore also examine the strength
and structure of states relative to their societies, because these affect
the proportion of national resources that can be allocated to foreign
policy’ (Rose 1998: 146-7). This is where this special issue fits in.
State capacity to extract resources from society has changed in recent
times, and not necessarily for the better. Moisés Naim (2013) argues
that power is shifting
… from West to East and North to South, from
presidential palaces to public squares, from
once formidable corporate behemoths to
nimble startups and, slowly but surely, from
men to women. But power is not merely
dispersing; it is also decaying. Those in power
today are more constrained in what they can do
with it and more at risk of losing it than ever
before.
If this is so, the democratisation of foreign policy may in fact weaken
governability, policy-making capacity, and even democratic
stability. Naim shows how the anti-establishment drive of micro
powers can topple tyrants, dislodge monopolies, and open
remarkable new opportunities, but can also lead to chaos and
paralysis. Today, insurgent forces dismantle power barriers more
quickly and easily than ever, only to find that they themselves
become vulnerable in the process. Civil society and social actors are
not (necessarily) insurgent forces, but Naim’s logic can be applied by
analogy. In this respect, pessimists can draw some comfort from
most of the articles in this special issue: in Latin America, the
influence of social demands over foreign policy-making is so weak
that it will never lead to political instability. For optimists, even the
small advances that have been registered are to be celebrated, and
there is no reasons to fear that increased social participation will
promote political instability.
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Social demands and civil society are relevant for foreign
policy-making in the country of origin, but their influence does not
end there. If, as Javier Solana (2009) has noted, ‘foreign policy is all
about the domestic politics of others’, a shrewd foreign policy
advisor should keep an eye on the social movements, civil society
organisations, interest associations, and public opinion in states
other than their own. For example, Schenoni and Ferrandi Aztiria
(2014) have suggested that asymmetric social participation in
Argentina and Brazil produce a differential impact on foreign policy
stability, bargaining power, and agenda-setting power. As the impact
of social participation is far greater in Brazil than in Argentina, the
latter country would gain from developing a public diplomacy that
courts Brazilian civil society, with a view to instrumentalising it
‘against’ Itamaraty if needs be. Even Merke and Pauselli (2015), who
were looking to assert the predominance of systemic over domestic
factors in respect of countries’ votes in the UN General Assembly,
found that such factors as the party in power in Washington and the
ideological leaning of Latin American governments had an impact
on the degree of voting convergence. This means that meddling in
others’ elections, or at least influencing their public opinion and
social demands, may constitute a pertinent foreign policy strategy.
This explains not only why the USA behaved as it did in the bad old
days, but also why Chávez has contributed money, activists, and
know-how to the electoral campaigns and governments of his
political allies in several other Latin American countries.
In an increasingly interdependent world, not only politics but also
societies become increasingly intertwined. Therefore, foreign
policy-making is more and more influenced by domestic factors, not
only in the country in question, but also in others. This special issue is
a valuable step towards advancing our knowledge of the brave new
world ahead.
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